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Judicial Means for the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes Between
Nations: Possibilities and Limitations
EVALUATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AS A MORE DYNAMIC INSTRUMENT FOR ESTABLISHING A
"RULE OF LAW" IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
By ANTHONY VERNANA-
STATEMENT
The purpose of this paper is to explore the status of the
International Court of Justice (hereinafter sometimes referred
to as the "I.C.J.") as an institution for the peaceful settlement of
disputes between nations. Where does that institution now stand;
where is it heading; what are the possibilities of the I.C.J.
becoming a more dynamic instrument for establishing a rule of
law in the international community?
Although discussion treats primarily the I.C.J., the implica-
tions are evident for the role of the judicial process itself in
world affairs. Settlement through diplomacy and mediation, and
their off-spring, the quasi-judicial arbitral process, are beyond the
scope of this paper; the writer, as an attorney, is interested in the
issue of the judicial process itself as a real and dynamic mover
in world pacific settlements. Is that process capable of playing
the active participant in the peaceful resolution of major issues?
An affirmative answer to that query necessarily premises a free
and independent body formulating independent judgments on
the merits of contentious issues presented to it; it is not a
compromiser of grievances as this writer believes the arbitral
process is now viewed, both in the municipal and international
arena; and, further, the questions which concern us are not
* Member New York Bar; LL.B., Georgetown University; LL.M., Harvard
University.
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whether some institutions may provide a smooth ground over
which continuing state relations may pass, but whether the
judicial process proper may play a major role in resolving major
international issues as they arise and with the confidence and
support of the international community.
The discussion is at points necessarily academic as is discussion
of almost all issues in the international area; but academicians
have out-run and out-scored the pragmatists in the international
field throughout this century, so academics do not appear to be
wholly out-of-order.
I. POSSIBILITIES UNDER THE PRESENT SYSTEM
Under the Charter
The International Court of Justice is established by Article 92
of the Charter of the United Nations as the "principal judicial
organ of the United Nations." All members of the United Na-
tions (hereinafter "U.N.") are, by Article 93 (1), ipso facto
parties to the Statute of the Court; and non-member states may,
as provided by Article 93 (2), become parties to the Statute on
conditions determined by the General Assembly upon recom-
mendation of the Security Council. The Charter in Article 96
specifically delegates to the Court power to give advisory opinions
on legal questions when requested by the General Assembly,
Security Council, or other organ or specialized agency of the U.N.
Because these Articles will be referred to hereinafter, Chapter
XIV of the Charter, entitled "The International Court of
Justice" is here set out.
Article 92
The International Court of Justice shall be the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in
accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and
forms an integral part of the present Charter.
Article 93
1. All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto
parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations
may become a party to the Statute of the International Court
of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the
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General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security
Council.
Article 94
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to
comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice
in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations
incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court,
the other party may have recourse to the Security Council,
which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or
decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judg-
ment.
Article 95
Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of
the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their dif-
ferences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in
existence or which may be concluded in the future.
Article 96
1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may
request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory
opinion on any legal question.
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized
agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the
General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the
Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their
activities.
Non-Compulsory Jurisdiction of the I.C.J.
As it now exists, the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. is non-com-
pulsory. Disputes may be voluntarily submitted to the Court ad
hoc or by prior agreement by states, which are parties to the
Statute of the Court, or by other states under conditions estab-
lished by the Security Council. Where there has ben a prior
agreement to submit certain disputes to the Court, its jurisdiction
has been said to be "compulsory" at the moment after such a
dispute has arisen, and when one party seeks to invoke the Court.1
This of course is not compulsory jurisdiction in its proper sense
however.
A state gives no jurisdiction to the Court simply by being a
party to the Statute. Article 36 thereof provides that:
1 Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict: A Treatise on the Dynamics
of Disputes-and War-Law, 123 (1959).
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the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the
parties refer to it, and all matters specially provided for ...
in treaties and Conventions in force.
This lack of compulsory jurisdiction in the I.C.J., other than as
discussed below, raises a real question as to the vitality of the
Court as a dynamic institution for the peaceful settlement, through
adjudication, of international disputes. Some writers have ex-
pressed the view that most international questions are "political"
rather than legal in nature and therefore not proper subjects for
judicial determination in any event-they are not justiciable
controversies.2 While there may be some merit for this position,
essentially it begs the real issue, which is whether the adjudicative
process should play, and is realistically capable of playing, a
greater and more dynamic role in international law and interna-
tional decision-making.
Essentially, law-making is an interstitial development involving
joinder in the process by branches of government, traditionally
delineated, but actually intimately interrelated, to form an
integrated legal process.3 The domestic legal process could require
little less in our time in any more complex society; each step in
that process is germane and contributes to the over-all result
which will be the rule of law by which societal behavior will be
governed and within the framework of which institutions and
individuals must act. But the same normative rules or laws must
also govern the international behavior of states. Necessarily in the
international arena the rules or laws-international law-are often
no more than ill-defined standards or custom. 4 Legal concep-
tions are of course fashioned and colored by ideology and the
national traditions and aspirations of the state in question; there-
fore, the overlap of legal and political issues. But this diversity
of view does not militate as of course against some tribunal par-
ticipating in an adjudicative fashion in the settlement of interna-
tional disputes. In order to effectively play that role as a vital
mover and catalyst in the international process, however, any
2 For a statement of the position see, e.g., Wagner, Is a Compulsory Adjudica-
tion of International Legal Disputes Possible?, 47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 21, at 22 (1952);
Stone, op. cit. supra note 1, at 146-152.
3 See Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law (1958).
4 Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of
Peace 71-79 (5th ed. 1955).
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such supra-national tribunal must be endowed with clearly de-
fined compulsory jurisdiction and ancillary powers.
Compulsory and Quasi-Compulsory Jurisdiction of the I.C.J.
The International Court of Justice does not have compulsory
jurisdiction as that term is commonly understood. It does how-
ever have a quasi-compulsory jurisdiction where the state-parties
to the dispute in question have accepted the "Optional Clause"
of the Court's Statute, Article 36, paragraph 2, or where the
parties have agreed under a multilateral or bilateral agreement
to submit controversies thereunder to the jurisdiction of the
Court.
The above jurisdiction of the I.C.J. while labeled "quasi-
compulsory" actually depends again upon some volitional act by
the states; properly labeled, this hybrid type jurisdiction is
simply an extension of voluntary submission on an ad hoc basis.
Acceptance of the "Optional Clause" of the Court's Statute
gives the Court jurisdiction in legal disputes over: (a) the
interpretation of a treaty; (b) questions of international law;
(c) the existence of facts, which, if established, would constitute
a breach of an international obligation; (d) or, the kind or
extent of reparation to be made for a breach of an international
obligation.
But the efficacy of accepting the "Optional Clause" may be
nullified by self-established reservations enunciated by the accept-
ing state in its acceptance. Typical is the reservation of the
United States that it will not submit to the Court disputes "es-
sentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of
America as determined by the United States of America." (The
so-called Connally Amendment.) The hypocrisy of extolling a
"rule of law" for the solution of international disputes, at least
those primarily of a legal nature, and at the same time invoking
an isolationist protectionism is indeed a hollow and paradoxical
vote of confidence in the international adjudicative process as an
institution for fostering that rule of law.5 This vote of no-
confidence is cumulatively felt since any party to the dispute
before the Court may, under the principle of mutuality, invoke
5 See the resolution of the American Bar Association calling for the withdrawal
of the U.S. reservation. 33 A.B.A.J. 249 (1947).
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the reservation which one of the parties may have. This fact
caused France in 1959 to abandon her reservation, which excluded
"differences relating to matters which are within the national
jurisdiction as understood by the government of the French
Republic," and to substitute instead "disputes relating to ques-
tions which by international law fall exclusively within the
domestic jurisdiction."6 The success of Norway in invoking the
original French reservation apparently caused the change.7
The possibility exists that states will remove their reservations
to the jurisdiction of the Court, and indeed there has been
considerable clamor from certain quarters in the United States
for its reservation to be dropped 8 But in addition to the United
States, Connally-type reservations to the Court's jurisdiction have
been made by Mexico (1947), Liberia (1952), the Union of
South Africa (1955), Pakistan (1957), and the Sudan (1957);
and of the thirty-seven states which have accepted the quasi-
compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J., only twenty-one have done
so without significant reservations. 9
But figures do not tell the whole story; nor does a possible
hint of a beginning trend the other way. The reservations repre-
sent manifestations of deep-seated concepts of national "sover-
eignty"; furthermore, they express views of international law and
its constituent purposes colored by conflicting political considera-
tions and ideologies. So long as these reservations to the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court exist, a road-block has in effect
been thrown in the way of establishing compulsory jurisdiction
in the Court. The effect of the reservations and the state attitudes
from which they spring has been candidly stated:
The failure of numerous nations to accept the Court's
jurisdiction, the crippling reservations of others and a general
disposition by diplomats not to seek a Court decision have
left the community of nations with less than a reliable judicial
remedy for the redress of actual or fancied wrongs to national
interests. Many controversies have arisen which might have
6 Emphasis added.
7 Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9.
s See, e.g., resolution of the American Bar Association referred to in note 5
supra. And see Douglas, The Rule of Law in World Affairs. (Santa Barbara:
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. 1961). Reprinted in A World
Without War (1961).
O Doub, The Unused Potential of the World Court, 40 For. Affairs 463
(1962).
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been susceptible of impartial jural determination. Yet in the
last sixteen years nations have obtained only nineteen de-
cisions from the Court, and these have been insufficient to
enable it to make conspicuous contributions to the develop-
ment of international law.10
The Court does have jurisdiction to determine its own juris-
diction" as municipal courts have.12 Realistically, as a more con-
servative body, composed of judges who are theoretically of varied
views and backgrounds, the Court will likely proceed with utmost
trepidation in areas where jurisdiction has not been previously
undertaken and where more adequate organs might more appro-
priately act. Moreover, a further deterrence against an over-
ambitious Court is the fact that its status and prestige ultimately
depend, at least for the present, upon the good-will of the world
community. The reservations, in light of this background, might
be considered as constituting rebuffs to the Court and imputations
of its competence. An argument which might conceivably be made
in favor of such reservations is that judicial determination neces-
sarily results in the establishment of precedent to govern other
similar disputes and that stare decisis is an inept and dangerous
principle in international decisions where states and ideologies
are recurrently changing. But this argument expresses its own
fallacy; decision by non-judicial organs on international questions
also establish precedent for later action by those branches within
the realm of their competence; and furthermore, it expresses the
view that the Court will not be able to focus its decision upon the
facts before it, or be able to distinguish its own precedent. But
even assuming, as one should, that judicial decision-making makes
judicial-law, unless the Court is permitted to act, unhampered
by reservations upon its jurisdiction, it shall remain a step-child,
even where genuine legal disputes are involved, in what should
be an interstitial process for the pacific settlement of international
controversies.
Advisory Opinions by the Court
Under Article 96 of the U.N. Charter the power to give
advisory opinions when requested by an appropriate branch of the
10 Id. at 465.
"1 See, e.g., Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, [1951] I.G.J. Rep. 93.
12 See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258,
67 Sup. Ct. 677 (1947).
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U.N. is vested in the Court. But the occasions for its use have
been limited. As of January, 1961, advisory opinions had been
requested by the General Assembly on only nine occasions, and
the Security Council had never requested an advisory opinion; 13
U.N.E.S.C.O. and the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organi7ation had each requested an opinion on one occasion.
14
While this power of the Court under Article 96 to render
advisory opinions operates in a non-justiciable setting, its opinions,
if given weight, can in these areas at least, and in interpreting the
Charter, again establish principles or standards for international
conduct. But here also the argument that the issues are basically
political in nature and not legal has sprung up; exponents of this
view also argue that referrals would tend to diminish the prestige
of the General Assembly and its fundamentally political approach.
Moreover, it has been speculated that the failure of the U.N. to
refer legal questions to the Court for its advisory opinion may
have had the beneficial effect of not drawing the Court into the
political area of the General Assembly.
Indeed if it did get too much involved in what are essentially
political quarrels, the Court might run the risk of appearing
merely the judicial instrument of the General Assembly. From
this point of view it is perhaps not wholly unfortunate that
the Assembly has not more often sought its advisory opinions. 1
But the logical extension of this view would be to abolish the
Court altogether; unless we are prepared to do just that or to
retain a Court whose powers lie dormant, this view is unac-
ceptable.
Some Suggestions under the Present System.
The preceding discussion has attempted to point up the funda-
mental weaknesses of the present system: the absence of com-
pulsory jurisdiction in the I.C.J., the crippling reservations of
nations to its quasi-compulsory jurisdiction, and a basic reluctance
on the part of the world community, including, as it would
generally appear, the U.N., to avail itself of the judicial process
of settlement. While mechanics for improving upon and strength-
13 Doub, supra note 9, at 465.
14 Ibid.
5 Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution, 147 (2nd ed.
1962).
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ening that system may be advanced, it augurs well that no change
can be realized unless basic attitudes are revised and a countervail-
ing push for judicial settlement, when appropriate, takes place.
One writer, deploring the inactive role of the Court, has put it
this way:
In conclusion, it may be said that recourse to the World
Court for the settlement of disputes between States is still
regarded as an exception, and that recourse to other modes of
settlement remains the rule. Only a fundamental change of
political climate and the acceptance of judicial means as the
normal, and not the exceptional, means of settling disputes
will enable the Court to play a more decisive part in the life
of the international community. 6
Nevertheless, a change in world attitude is not likely to appear
lazily on the horizon some dawn without an atmosphere or
groundwork having first been established. The initial step would
appear to be acceptance of the optional clause by all U.N. mem-
bers without reservations. This is indeed highly unlikely however,
especially_ for the Soviet Union.17 Nevertheless, since the I.C.J.
does provide a forum for arguing and settling questions of facts
and law in international legal disputes, at the least nations could
more frequently and recurrently include in bilateral and multi-
lateral treaties provisions for submission to the I.C.J. But unless
those nations acceding to the optional clause and pursuing this
practice abolish or drastically curtail their reservations to the
Court's jurisdiction, the present system will prevail. While clamor
may arise to do away with the reservations, as long as the state
believes that its national interest is being served thereby, they
will remain in existence and be invoked.
18
But even if the reservations cannot be entirely eliminated, and
before raising the banner of an amendment to the U.N. Charter
which would make compulsory the adjudication of all legal
disputes,' 9 it must be remembered that the I.C.J. has jurisdiction
16 Honig, The Diminishing Role of the World Court, 34 Int'l Aff. 184, 194
(1958).
17 See Wagner, supra note 2, at 53.
IS Witness the U.S. objection, based on the Conally Amendment, to the
Court's jurisdiction in the recent Interhandel Case, I.C.J. Rep. 6 (1959). Dis-
cussed in 35 N.Y. U.L. Rev. 1, 13-21 (1960).
19 Discussed in Part II infra.
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to determine its own jurisdiction, as expressed in legal termi-
nology.210 While this might appear to be simply a procedural
nicety, the power is actually real and important. It means in
effect that the Court could strike down a reservation to its
competence as invalid and hold that it has jurisdiction over the
controversy under international law. Reservations, and objections
based on a claimed absence of consent, may therefore be struck
down; even if the Court did not ultimately assume jurisdiction
over the merits of the dispute, it has power under the Statute,
Article 41, paragraph 1, to order provisional measures during
the interim.
21
A flexible control of these powers, orientating their use
towards increased participation by the Court in settling world
legal disputes on their merits, but without offending settled
principles, is indeed an art. Nevertheless, the powers exist, and
doubtless a World Court truly ready to play its role could wield
them judiciously and effectively. Here also the intervenor Articles
of the Court's Statute should be noted. Article 63 gives a state,
if the case involves the interpretation of a convention to which it
is a party, the power to intervene as of right. Article 62 allows
intervention, with the Court's permission, by a state which has a
legal interest in the dispute which "may be affected by a decision
in the case." While intervention in the case depends upon the
act of the third-party state, the Court could on its own initiative
encourage a greater use of the permissive intervention device.
As in the municipal arena, there is an interest in adjudicating all
possible claims in a single law-suit. But here again state policies
and self-interest are involved, so that a greater use of permissive
intervention may have to await greater acceptance of the judicial
process as a mode for settling international legal issues.
20 The Statute of the Court, Article 36, paragraph 6 provides:
... in the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction,
the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
And see note 11 supra,
21 Article 41, paragraph I of the Statute gives the Court power:
... to indicate if it considers that the circumstances so require, any
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective
rights of either party.
See also the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, supra note 11. And see for a discussion
of the question of the Court's jurisdiction Note, The Corfu Channel Case: The




How are the decisions of the I.C.J. to be enforced? Article
94 (2) of the U.N. Charter provides that:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations in-
cumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court,
the other party may have recourse to the Security Council,
which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or
decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the
judgment.
Power therefore exists to enforce a judgment of the I.C.J. How-
ever, leaving enforcement to the Security Council rather than to
the Court itself almost of necessity negates the very existence of
the power. True, if the members of the Council support the
Court and its decisions, the power may be real, i.e., as real, and
with the evident shortcomings, as is enforcement by any political
body of a legal decision. Under the present system, therefore, all
that can be realistically hoped for is that the pressure of world
public opinion, though in large part unsympathetic toward the
Court, will be brought to bear against the recalcitrant litigant.
Before taking up possible revision of the present system, it is
here urged that the advisory jurisdiction of the Court be put to
greater use. Although, as noted, this power is a non-justiciable
one, operating as it does in a non-contentious setting, the effective
and timely use of this power would at the least increase awareness
that an institution does exist which may serve as the final organ for
determining legal questions of world import. Perhaps through
this process a gateway will be opened leading to the door of
judicial process for the settlement of international legal disputes.
The view that the I.C.J. has been mercifully extricated from the
U.N.'s political process by that institution's apparent reluctance
to seek its opinions cannot be acquiesced in. But, on the other
hand, it should be remembered here that the paramount issue is
the pacific settlement of international disputes. While we may
deplore an impotent judicial organ, we must not allow this to
blind us to the advances and successes of other organs seeking the
same ultimate goal. While the best legal systems are those which
operate as interstitial entities, it must not be forgotten that the
movement for world-government is still an infant only now,
hopefully, beginning to learn to walk; perhaps its judicial legs
are only a step behind.
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II. REVISION OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM
The preceding pages have discussed the possibilities and limita-
tions under the present U.N. Charter and practice of increasing
the role of the I.C.J. in the peaceful settlement of disputes
between nations. That discussion sought to point out that a world
judicial organ should be a very essential component of the
machinery for peace. Here, the possibility of revising the U.N.
Charter is taken up. This is of course a long-range approach to
the problem of establishing higher standards of international
justice and stability. Again, it presupposes that the narrow por-
tectionalism of national self-interest will give way to a more
honest and generous approach by states.
First of all, the suggestion that the number of judges (now
fifteen) be increased to reflect the increase in U.N. membership
since the establishment of the Court should not be accepted. 22
The Court's Statute now provides for ad hoc national judges who
may be selected by a state if there is no judge of its nationality
on the Court. 23 To cater to national interest further by increasing
the number of the Court until an unwieldly and slow-to-act in-
stitution is created would hardly serve to establish a more dynamic
judicial organ.
Should individuals have standing before the Court? At the
present time only states may be parties before the Court in an
adversary proceeding; even the U.N. and its organs have no
standing before the Court in an adversary proceeding. A state may
of course, in its own name, prosecute the claims of its citizens;
thus an issue of state-responsibility is raiised. While traditionally
international law acts on states and not individuals, the validity
of this principle at least since Nuremberg may be shaken to some
extent. It might well be argued that to give individuals standing
before the Court will open up a flood gate of litigation and over-
burden the judges, but the European experiment in this area
does not show this to be true.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which came into force in
1953, establishes a bill of rights for the nationals of member-
22 Discussed in Honig, supra note 16, at 184.
23 See Stone, op. cit. supra note 1, at 115.
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nations-fourteen out of fifteen nations that are members of the
Council of Europe have ratified the Convention-and an adminis-
trative and judicial system to enforce those rights. 24 Complaints
may be brought by individuals against their own government or
by aliens against another government; there is no jurisdiction
until all domestic remedies have been exhausted. The Commis-
sion of Human Rights, the administrative enforcement agency
created by the Convention, before which the complaint is initially
brought has been quite busy, but the Court of Human Rights
itself, whose judgments are final, has not been; a case may be
brought before the Court by the Commission or a state concerned
only after a successful settlement has not been achieved at the
administrative level. Expansion of the principles of the Con-
vention on an international scale would be a welcomed extension
of legal control and protection over human rights and freedoms.
Proposals ranging from an amendment of the U.N. Charter,
which would give the I.C.J. final authority at least in interpreting
the Charter, to advocating the transformation of the world struc-
ture from a system of sovereign states into a federal union have
been advanced. 25 While more or less realistic, it is clear that an
effective judiciary requires both compulsory jurisdiction and
power to enforce its own decisions.26 This is the ideal of the
lawyer, as well as the more advanced principle of powers of
appellate review over decisions of municipal courts which concern
genuine issues of international law, and the establishment of
special international courts, as well as those on a regional basis,
to handle more specialized or regional legal problems.
At this point it is well to note the proposed revision of the
U.N. Charter called for by Grenville Clark and Professor Louis B.
Sohn of Harvard..2 7 This extensive revision of the Charter is
aimed at establishing the U.N. as a more effective institution with
greater powers for war prevention. The proposals are closely
connected with a detailed plan for general and complete disarma-
ment. Essentially, the revised Charter in the area of the judiciary
would provide for:
24 Discussed in Douglas, supra note 8, at 169-171.
25 Discussed in Wagner, supra note 2, at 48-51.
26See Kelsen, Compulsory Adjudication of International Disputes, 37 Am. J.
Int'l L. 397 (1948).
27 Clark & Sohn, World Peace Through World Law (2d ed. rev. 1962).
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(1) the continuance of the International Court of Justice
with new authority to interprete the Charter and with extensive
compulsory jurisdiction over legal disputes between all nations;
(2) the establishment of a new World Equity Tribunal,
with broad authority to deal with disputes of a non-legal nature;
(3) the establishment of a World Conciliation 'Board to assist
nations in finding agreed solutions for their disputes; and,
(4) the establishment of a system of inferior tribunals em-
powered to try individual offenders against the Charter and the
limited class of laws for the prevention of war which could be
enacted by the General Assembly and to pass upon the validity
of various acts of United Nations organs and officials.28
The Articles as revised are here set out:
Proposed Article 92
1. The International Court of Justice shall be the prin-
cipal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in
accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and
forms an integral part of this revised Charter as Part A of
Annex III.
2. All member Nations are ipso facto parties to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.
3. A state which is not a member of the United Nations
may become a party to the Statute of the International Court
of Justice on conditions to be set forth in general regulations
to be adopted by the General Assembly.
Proposed Article 93
1. The World Equity Tribunal, established by Article 7
of this revised Charter, shall function in accordance with the
annexed Statute which forms an integral part of this revised
Charter as Part B of Annex III.
2. The World Conciliation Board, established by Article
7 of this revised Charter, shall function in accordance with
the annexed Statute which forms an integral part of this
revised Charter as Part C of Annex III.
3. The regional courts of the United Nations, established
by Part D of Annex III, shall function in accordance with the
provisions thereof. Subject to these provisions, the General
28 Id. at 175.
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Assembly shall determine from time to time the organization,
jurisdiction and procedure of the regional courts.
Proposed Article 94
1. Each member Nation undertakes to comply with the
decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to
which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations
incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court,
the other party may have recourse to the General Assembly
which shall decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to
the judgment, including measures under Articles 41 and 42.
3. If any nation fails to comply with any recommendation
of the World Equity Tribunal which has been approved by
the General Assembly in accordance with paragraph 9 of
Article 36, the Assembly shall decide upon measures to be
taken to give effect to the recommendation, including meas-
ures under Articles 41 and 42.
Proposed Article 95
Nothing in this revised Charter shall prevent member
Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to
other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence
or which may be concluded in the future.
Proposed Article 96
1. The General Assembly, the Executive Council, the Eco-
nomic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council or the
World Equity Tribunal may request the International Court
of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
2. Other organs of the United Nations, specialized agen-
cies and regional organizations, which may at any time be so
authorized by the General Assembly, may also request ad-
visory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within
the scope of their activities.
3. Any dispute relating to the interpretation or application
of this revised Charter, or the constitutionality, interpretation
or application of any law or regulation enacted thereunder,
may be submitted for decision to the Court by any member
Nation or any other state, either on its own behalf or on
behalf of any of its citizens.
29
The writer endorses these proposed revisions as long-range
goals to be aimed for. However, there is'little hope that such a
comprehensive plan will be accepted in the relatively near future.
29 Id. at 175-181.
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III. Conclusion
It does not seem realistic to hope for any quick panacea to the
world attitude which has left the judiciary the almost forgotten
step-child in the pacific settlement of legal disputes between na-
tions. However, it is apparent that genuine world peace can only
be achieved through a system of world law maintained by effective
and coordinated organs. It does not seem too impractical to
expect that in the not-too-distant future the charter may be
amended to give the I.C.J. compulsory jurisdiction over inter-
national legal disputes; but if even this is beyond present
expectation, at the least we may hope that nations will be more
ready to submit the legal issues in their disputes to an impartial
judicial determination, and that the Security Council will be more
willing to exercise its unused potential under Article 94 (2). The
obligation is upon the United States itself and those other nations
which profess to advocate a rule of law in international affairs to
lead the way. With increased use of the Court and a more
imaginative and dynamic, albeit impartial, use of its powers by
the Court when a controversy comes before it, it should be
apparent that both the Court's prestige and the rule of law in
international affairs will have taken a giant step forward.
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